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CIVIL PROCEDURE-MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT-TIME FOR MOTION*

-During the presentation of evidence in the course of a lengthy trial, it often
becomes clear that no right to recovery exists. Can a motion be made at
that time, before the opponent's case is completed, for a directed verdict?
Once the trial has begun,' most states do not allow a motion for a directed
verdict until the close of the opponent's case, 2 or until the close of all the
evidence. 3 A few states, notably California, 4 have adopted a more liberal
approach which allows the motion during the opponent's case in certain limited
situations. The New Mexico Supreme Court has indicated approval of this
liberal approach. 5
Home Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp.6 was an
action by a drilling company's insurer against the well owner and welding
contractor for damages sustained from a rig fire. The fire was apparently
caused by a welding spark which ignited excess oil accumulated in the cellar
over which the welding took place. The controlling issues were (1) whether a
duty existed to keep the cellar free from oil, and (2) if so, whether that
duty rested on the drilling contractor (plaintiff) or on the owner. The
plaintiff's first witness was the drilling contractor's tool pusher, Reynolds,
who testified that it was his crew's duty to keep the cellar free from oil and
that he had made no inspection to determine if the cellar was free from oil
* Home Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 381 P.2d 675 (N.M.
1963).
1. This comment will not discuss the problem of motions for directed verdicts on
the basis of opening statements of counsel. See generally Otis Elevator Co. v. Monks,
191 F.2d 1000 (Ist Cir. 1951) ; Annot., 129 A.L.R. 557 (1940) ; Annot., 83 A.L.R. 221
(1933).
2. Service Cas. Co. v. Carr, 101 Ga. App. 70, 113 S.E.2d 175 (1960) ; Strzelecki v.
The Fair, 299 Ill. App. 113, 19 N.E.2d 624 (1939) ; Budner v. Giunta, 16 App. Div. 2d
780, 228 N.Y. Supp. 2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ; Warren v. Winfrey, 244 N.C. 521, 94
S.E.2d 481 (1956) ; Williamson v. Holloway, 69 Okla. 254, 172 Pac. 44 (1918) ; Murphy
v. Eraas, 41 S.D. 500, 171 N.W. 326 (1919) ; Atchley v. Sims, 23 Tenn. App. 167, 128
S.W.2d 975 (1938); Bethers v. Wood, 10 Utah 2d 313, 352 P.2d 774 (1960) ; Mau v.
Stoner, 10 Wyo. 125, 67 Pac. 618 (1902).
3. Jacobs v. Connecticut Co., 137 Conn. 189, 75 A.2d 427 (1950) ; Dyar Sales &
Mach. Co. v. Mininni, 132 Me. 79, 166 Atl. 620 (1933) ; Dunbar v. Fant, 170 S.C. 414,
170 S.E. 460 (1933).
4. Perry v. First Corp., 167 Cal. App. 2d 359, 334 P.2d 299 (1st Dist. Ct. App.
1959), and cases cited therein. See also State ex rel. McConnell v. District Court of
Seventeenth Judicial Dist., 120 Mont. 253, 182 P.2d 846 (1947), which expressly adopts
the California rule; and Glass v. Carnation Co., 60 Wash. 2d 341, 373 P.2d 775 (1962),
which adopts an identical rule.
5. Home Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 381 P.2d 675
(N.M. 1963) ; Moody v. Hastings, 381 P.2d 207 (N.M. 1963) ; Turner v. Judah, 59
N.M. 470, 286 P.2d 317 (1955) ; Hatch v. Strebeck, 58 N.M. 824, 277 P.2d 317 (1954).
6. 381 P.2d 675 (N.M. 1963).
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before he directed the welder to work over it. On the basis of this testimony,
which pointed strongly to the plaintiff's negligence, the defendant moved
for a directed verdict. The plaintiff objected and offered evidence which would
tend to show that it was the owner's duty to keep the cellar free from oil and
that the operations were under the control of the owner. The trial court
refused to hear the evidence and directed a verdict for the defendant. On appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court, held, Reversed. 7 The motion was
premature in that the plaintiffs had not presented all their evidence on the
issue of liability, and the trial court erred in refusing to hear the offered
testimony which might reveal the plaintiff's witness' testimony as mistaken,
thereby destroying the inference of contributory negligence. 8
In Home Fire and Marine, the court based its decision on Hatch v. Strebeck,9 an action for a broker's commission, in which the plaintiff called the
defendant as an adverse witness. On the basis of testimony elicited from the
defendant, the plaintiff moved for a directed verdict. The plaintiff had not
rested; the defendant had not begun to put on his case. The trial court denied
the motion, and the supreme court affirmed, holding that "from the point of
view of the orderly administration of justice and by the wording of Rule
50(a) of the [New Mexico] Rules of Civil Procedure,[101 .. . [s]uch a
motion ordinarily cannot be made until movant's adversary has presented his
case or rested."" The report of the Hatch case does not disclose what evidence
was elicited from the defendant which led the plaintiff to move for a directed
verdict; however, it may be assumed that the defendant admitted making the
brokerage contract under which the supreme court ultimately held the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
The court in Home Fire and Marine distinguished two prior cases in
which the court had allowed a premature motion for a directed verdict or for
7. 381 P.2d at 682.
8. 381 P.2d at 680-81.
9. 58 N.M. 824, 277 P.2d 317 (1954).

10. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1 (50) (a) (1953):
A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence
offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the motion is not
granted, without having reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as
if the motion had not been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not
granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action
have moved for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state
the specific grounds therefor.
The New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure, N.M. Stat .Ann. §§21-1-1(1)-(91)
(1953, Supp. 1963), are cited as N.M. R. Civ. P. throughout this comment.
11. Hatch v. Strebeck, 58 N.M. 824, 826, 277 P.2d 317, 318 (1954). (Emphasis
added.)
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dismissal under Rule 41 (b).
In the first case, Turner v. Judah,"s an
election contest proceeding, the trial court allowed a motion "in the nature of
a motion for judgment on the pleadings" made by the defendant during the
presentation of the plaintiff's case. Before the motion, at the court's request,
the plaintiff's counsel stated to the court and read into the record what he
expected to prove by his remaining witnesses; the trial court then granted the
motion "considering such [offered] evidence as might be admissible, as though
it were in evidence."' 1 4 The supreme court upheld the action of the trial court,
saying:
Thus it appears that the trial court did not refuse to hear the evidence tendered by the appellant's counsel but considered the admissible parts as though the witnesses had testified and decided the
case on all of the admissions and evidence offered by both parties.' 5
The second case distinguished by the court, Moody v. Hastings,'6 was a
workmen's compensation action in which the plaintiff had filed suit prematurely. A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was made and sustained
after the plaintiff had presented all of his evidence except the testimony of
his medical expert. The objction to the prematurity of the motion was first
made in the supreme court. The court held that since all of the plaintiff's evidence on the issue of liability except the medical testimony had been introduced,
it was not error for the trial court to grant the motion to dismiss, since the
plaintiff's remaining testimony could only affect the extent, not the existence,
of defendant's liability.
The decision in Home Fire and Marine, when compared with the holdings
in the Hatch, Moody, and Turner cases, clarifies the court's position as to
when a motion for dismissal or directed verdict will be considered fatally
premature. A synthesis of these decisions and the court's explanation of these
12. N.M. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) :
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the de-

fendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion
is not granted, may move for dismissal upon the ground that upon the facts
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. In an action tried by
the court without a jury the court as trier of the facts may then determine them
and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment
on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided
in Rule 52 (a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies,
a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in
this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper

venue, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
13.
14.
15.
16.

59 N.M. 470, 286 P.2d 317 (1955).
Id. at 475, 286 P.2d at 320.
Id. at 476, 286 P.2d at 321.
381 P.2d 207 (N.M. 1963).
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prior cases in Home Fire and Marine indicates that the court has adopted the
more liberal rule, i.e., a motion for a directed verdict may be made before
the close of the opponent's case in limited situations. This raises the questions:
(1) under what circumstances is the premature motion proper; (2) what
device may be used to terminate the trial during opponent's presentation of
evidence; (3) is the liberal rule correct?
Under what circumstances can the motion be made? The New Mexico
rule as outlined by Home Fire and Marine is closely comparable to the approach taken by the California courts. 17 From a reading of the cases in both
jurisdictions, it is clear that the motion can be granted only if the party
moved against has presented all of his evidence on an issue necessary to proof
of liability,' 8 or if he makes no further offer of proof on such issue.' 9 If this
evidence is insufficient to establish the moving party's liability, or if it establishes
an affirmative defense,20 then the motion can be granted under the rule as
adopted in New Mexico. However, elements of surprise can enter here.
When a party has been genuinely surprised by evidence which negates the
inference of liability, the court might well grant a continuance or a re-call of
witnesses to enable the party to salvage his case. 2' If surprise testimony leads to
17. See Perry v. First Corp., 167 Cal. App. 2d 359, 334 P.2d 299 (1st Dist. Ct. App.
1959) ; Dineen v. City and County of San Francisco, 38 Cal. App. 2d 486, 101 P.2d 736
(1st Dist. Ct. App. 1940) ; Skelton v. Schacht Motor Car Co., 22 Cal. App. 144, 133
Pac. 504 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1913).
18. Moody v. Hastings, 381 P.2d 207 (N.M. 1963) ; see note 16 supra and accompanying text. See also Perry v. First Corp., 167 Cal. App. 2d 299 (1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1959).
19. State ex rel. McConnel v. District Court of Seventeenth Judicial Dist., 120
Mont. 253, 182 P.2d 846 (1947). In McConnell the court expressly adopted the California rule.
20. The problem of what evidence will entitle a party to a directed verdict or dismissal is beyond the scope of this comment. See generally Bell v. Ware, 69 N.M. 308,
366 P.2d 706 (1961) ; Sandoval v. Brown, 66 N.M. 235, 346 P.2d 551 (1959).

21. In Glass v. Carnation Co., 60 Wash. 2d 341, 373 P.2d 775 (1962), the plaintiff
had completed his presentation of evidence on the issue of defendant's liability without
having proved liability. His only remaining evidence was medical testimony. The defendant moved for dismissal and the plaintiff's counsel asked that the plaintiff be
allowed to testify again on the issue of liability. The trial court refused and granted

the dismissal. The Supreme Court of Washington reversed:
[T]he trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant the request to recall the plaintiff on the issue of liability. Our reluctance to grant a new trial
is attributable to our feeling that the trial court was correct in its con-

clusion that this would be a futile gesture; nevertheless, the plaintiff was entitled to the further opportunity to attempt to establish the liability of the
defendant by his own testimony or that of other witnesses then present and
ready to testify. This would have occasioned only a trifling delay. We would
agree that an offer of relevant proof would have been necessary to justify the

delay involved in securing any witnesses not then available.
373 P.2d at 776.
But see Dineen v. City and County of San Francisco, 38 Cal. App. 2d 486, 101 P.2d
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an inference of an affirmative defense, such as contributory negligence, there
seems to be stronger reason for allowing the continuance. The liberal approach
evidenced by the rule permitting premature motions should not be allowed to
work a retreat from the liberal approach of allowing each party his day in
court.
Even if the party moved against makes an offer of further proof, the motion
can be granted if the court treats all the offered proof as being in evidence
when ruling on the motion. 22 When this procedure is being followed, it is
suggested that counsel make an effort to have the procedure reflected either
in the record or in the order granting the motion. If this is not done, the
appellate court might conclude that the trial court refused to consider the
offered evidence.

23

What device may be used? The New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure provide four means for terminating an action on the merits before it has run its
course. These are (1) judgment on the pleadings, 24 (2) summary judgment, 25
(3)

27
26
dismissal for failure to show a right to relief, and (4) directed verdict.

The motions for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment are
ordinarily confined to pre-trial situations, 28 and the dismissal for failure to
show a right to relief and directed verdict provisions are intended for use
after trial has begun. Therefore, the proper motion after trial has begun is
736 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1940), where the plaintiff's counsel stated at the conclusion
of his proof of liability that he had other witnesses on the issue of liability who were
not available at the time but would be available in five days. The defendant moved
for dismissal. The trial court granted the motion after denying the plaintiff's request
for continuance. The District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it was not an
abuse of discretion to deny the continuance.
22. Turner v. Judah, 59 N.M. 470, 286 P.2d 317 (1955); see notes 13-15 supra
and accompanying text.
23. This might have occurred in Home Fire and Marine. Even though the trial
court refused to allow the introduction of the plaintiff's remaining evidence, it may
have considered that evidence in its ruling on the motion.
24. N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
25. N.M. R. Civ. P. 56.
26. N.M. R. Civ. P. 41 (b).
N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) provides for a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted." The rule provides that this motion "shall
be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted." Thus the motion is
clearly a pre-trial device. While N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(h) provides that the defense
presented by this motion is not waived by failure to assert it either in a motion or a
responsive pleading, it is clear that the function of this motion is served by the N.M.
R. Civ. P. 50(a) and 41(b) motions once the trial has begun.
27. N.M. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
28. N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(c), provides for a motion for judgment on the pleadings
"after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial." N.M.
R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides that "the motion [for summary judgment] shall be served
at least ten [10] days before the time fixed for the hearing." These provisions clearly
indicate that both devices are intended for use before trial.
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either for dismissal under Rule 41(b) 29 in a non-jury trial or for a directed
verdict under Rule 50(a) 30 in a jury trial. It is now clear that the motion to
dismiss for failure to show a right to relief is merely the non-jury trial complement of the motion for a directed verdict.31 Both rules provide for the motion
at the close of the opponent's evidence but neither forbids the motion at an
earlier time. 32 The New Mexico Supreme Court has already indicated 33 that,
on the issue of prematurity, 34 it will not distinguish between the motion for
directed verdict and the motion for dismissal.
Is the liberal rule correct? The liberality of the Rules of Civil Procedure
is reflected in two sometimes competing notions. One notion is that justice is
best served by allowing each party his day in court; this is reflected in the
rules allowing amendments to pleadings and continuances. 35 The other notion
is that justice is subserved by a more rapid procedure for deciding actions;
this is reflected in the liberal discovery rules36 and the various procedures discussed above for bringing fruitless actions to a halt.
The rule allowing premature motions for dismissal or for a directed verdict in certain circumstances, which New Mexico apparently now follows,
does not conflict with the liberality of the Rules of Civil Procedure. When
it becomes evident that a party cannot establish his right to recovery, courts
should not look with disfavor upon a motion made at that time to end the trial.
JOHN

R.

COONEY

29. N.M. R. Civ. P. 41 (b).
30. N.M. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
31. Cf. O'Brien v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 293 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Wolf
v. Reynolds Elec. & Eng'r Co., 304 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1962). See also Advisory Committee's Note to the 1963 amendment of Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 157 (Foundation Press, 1963).
32. N.M. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides that the motion for dismissal may be made
after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence. N.M. R. Civ. P.
50(a) states that "a party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the
evidence offered by an opponent" neither waives his right to present evidence if the
motion is denied nor waives a jury trial. While this language obviously permits the
motion at the close of the opponent's proof, it is clear that it does not forbid the
motion at an earlier time.
33. In Turner v. Judah, 59 N.M. 470, 286 P.2d 317 (1955), the defendant made a
motion "in the nature of a motion for judgment on the pleadings." Id. at 475, 286 P.2d
at 320. Since the trial court made findings of fact when it rendered judgment, and since
the motion was made during the presentation of the plaintiff's case, the motion which
was made is indistinguishable from a motion for dismissal under N.M. R. Civ. P. 41 (b).
34. Note, however, that upon a motion for dismissal in a non-jury trial under N.M.
R. Civ. P. 41(b), the trial court is not required to consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party moved against, but is free to make findings as the trier
of facts. See Hickman v. Mylander, 68 N.M. 340, 362 P.2d 500 (1961).
35. N.M. R. Civ. P. 15.
36. N.M. R. Civ. P. 26-30.

